Abstract: Interpretations of data in qualitative research may be biased for many reasons. This paper explores three commonly overlooked problems from a rather positivist point of view and deals with them mainly through the lens of cognitive psychology and survey methodology. The first problem is that researchers and readers of the research tend to trust retrospective data too much even though it is known that our memory is highly reconstructive. The second problem is that we often create interpretations too quickly and do not ground them in data well. The third problem is inappropriately generalising our findings because we underrate the variability of the phenomena studied. The aim is not to employ quantitative criteria in qualitative research but to show that especially in cases where we seek more objectivity (e.g., factual information about events) and less about the subjective phenomenal world (e.g., how people perceive these events from today's perspective), cognitive psychology or survey methodology can offer valuable insights. Recommendations about what researchers should be careful of and how to increase the objectivity of the interpretations are offered.
Introduction
Business success stories provide a good starting point for thinking about several issues that question the quality of interpretations in qualitative research. A good example is the proclaimed instant business classic Built to Last by Jim Collins and Jerry Porras, which compares eighteen pairs of competing companies. The thorough analysis shows that some companies are more successful than others in the long run because of differences in strategies, corporate culture, or management practices. Any CEO who puts the advice into practice could thus hypothetically build a successful "visionary company".
The problem with the book Built to last and many others (e.g., In search of Excellence or The $100 Startup) is not that they do not provide useful advice-most of the advice is certainly worth following-but that the tricky part is that readers tend to trust the HUMAN AFFAIRS 24, 178-188, 2014 DOI: 10.2478 interpretations and conclusions of the authors too much. Even though writers of research studies and their readers generally tend to be more cautious than readers of popular business books, there is good reason to place less trust in interpretations found in research studies. I will focus only on qualitative research here but most of these problems are present in quantitative research as well. So, what dangers do both popular business authors and qualitative researchers share when interpreting data? a) They tend to trust the retrospective data and stories too much (= disputable quality of retrospective information); b) Even when the retrospective or other data is "objective" 2 , authors tend to find persuasive stories too quickly (= "good story" bias); and c) Even when the data is "objective" and the stories well-founded, there still remains the problem of overgeneralisation (= overgeneralisation from small samples). Before examining these three issues in more detail, I will begin with a short overview of these three dangers.
Firstly, company success is usually studied retrospectively. As we know from everyday experience and research studies, everything makes sense retrospectively because we tend to find a good story or a causal chain of great decisions in almost everything due to our need to make sense of things (Taleb, 2010) . Retrospective views, however, underrate the impact of luck or unknown factors. After some time had elapsed, the "visionary successful companies" studied by Collins and Porras were averagely successful in regards to profitability and stock returns compared to companies previously labelled "loser companies" (Kahneman, 2011) .
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The same trend is visible in In Search of Excellence (see Rosenzweig, 2007) and in Fortune's America's Most Admired Companies list according to Anginer, Fisher, & Statman's (2008) analysis of the list over a 23 year period. Why should qualitative researchers not be prone to similar "narrative fallacies" (a term coined by Taleb, 2010 ) when most of their data is retrospective too? Secondly, the most important feature of a business bestseller is usually not the quality or the quantity of information, though both are important, but the quality and persuasiveness of the story (Kahneman, 2011; Heath & Heath, 2007) . Robert Kiyosaki, the author of the Rich Dad Poor Dad: What The Rich Teach Their Kids About Money That the Poor and Middle Class Do Not! made up the whole story about his "rich dad" and often ignores the amount of risk in his advice. 4 But nobody seems to be bothered because the story is strong and seems to be authentic. Research studies also "sell" and pass the review process more easily when they have a good and attractive story (Sternberg & Sternberg, 2010) . This danger is greater with 2 Quotation marks emphasize that "objectivity" is a questionable term in qualitative research. Objectivity is used to stress that we can gather more or less biased data and in the context of this article the goal is to obtain less biased data. 3 It must be mentioned, to be fair, that Collins and Porras speak about "visionary" companies that are generally more successful, profitable, and enduring but in the short run may of course have trouble too. This is especially highlighted in the appendix (p. 250) but I suppose not many readers pay much attention to it. 4 Kiyosaki acknowledged this in an interview for SmartMoney (2/2003). researchers who know how to write attractively, and possibly even more with authorities in the field who may not be questioned as much as less experienced authors.
5 Even though this should not happen in anonymous peer review, the reviewer may be aware of who the author is, e.g., due to the unique topic chosen or style of writing.
Thirdly, business authors often tend to forget that the variability of their phenomena (samples) may be quite substantial. The success factor of eighteen companies can, but need not necessarily, say much about other companies due to unstudied differences or different contexts. This issue of generalisation is one of the most difficult in qualitative research. How can we generalise from one or a few cases?
6 Unfortunately, no simple formulas exist, although some guidance is available.
There are more issues connected with the quality of interpretation, e.g., the chosen method of interpretation or the impact of our own experience, but these are well covered in most qualitative research companions and articles (see e.g., Creswell, 2013; Spry, 2011; Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014; Ptáčková, 2012) . The reason for choosing these three topics is that I find that many qualitative researchers do not seem to take them seriously. I also believe that qualitative researchers (not only the less experienced) could learn a lot from other disciplines that cover these issues from different but inspiring perspectives. I will mostly use the knowledge base of cognitive psychology (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Baron, 2008) and psychology of survey response (e.g., Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000; Bradburn, Sudman, & Wansink, 2004) .
The following section will be especially relevant for types of qualitative research where objectivity is the main issue and we want to create a theory that can be at least partially generalised to other settings or to other people-for example, when we, with the help of grounded theory, want to find out why some people comply less with a treatment than others.
Disputable quality of retrospective information and stories we make from it
Qualitative researchers often use interviews as a primary source of data. Retrospectively gathered information about the past, however, is seriously problematic especially when the aim is not to determine how people interpret the situation from today's perspective but what really happened at the time and why. As we saw in the example with successful companies, it is very easy to create a story of success or failure once we know the results. This is supported by the fact that our current goals have an impact not only on the choice of episodes from our past (what material will be consciously available) but it also alters the memories or even fabricates them in order to keep the memories self-coherent (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004) . Researchers should be especially aware of the fact that to find a good story 5 This happened for example in a case of academic fraud involving the Tilburg psychologist Diederik Stapel (see e.g., Carey, 2011) . 6 It can be argued that the main aim in qualitative research is never to generalise in the traditional sense (generalising to the whole population). However, we usually want to go behind our data, to show that a lesson can be learned from what we found even if we are mainly interested in the phenomenal world of the individuals. Therefore, in the broadest sense we usually want to generalise from our data (see part III of this article for more details). in retrospective accounts is very easy because we are sense-making creatures (Taleb, 2010) . A partial fix to this problem that I recommend to my students is to write down preliminary hypotheses, theories, or expectations in advance (if possible) even in the most exploratory type of research. By doing this, students can compare their previous ideas to current ones and see whether the data is counter-intuitive to their predictions or not.
Our memories are biased not only because of our current goals. In order not to be overwhelmed, the memory plays other tricks on us too. Schacter (1999) lists seven "sins" of memory: bias as already mentioned (retrospective distortions produced by current knowledge, beliefs, or persistence), 7 transience (the degrading accessibility of memory over time), absent-mindedness (a lack of attention and forgetting to do things-both in encoding stage and retrieval stage), blocking (temporary inaccessibility of stored information), misattribution (attribution of memories to incorrect sources or believing that we have seen or heard something we have not), suggestibility (incorporation of misinformation into memory due to e.g., leading questions), and persistence (unwanted recollections that we cannot forget).
Some types of memories are more prone to be forgotten and to other distortions than others, and researchers should therefore be aware whether they are asking about something people generally know quite well or not. For example, college students forget the names of classmates or teachers very slowly (Bahrick, Bahrick, & Wittlinger, 1975; Whitten & Leonard, 1981) but forget the street names in their college town quite quickly (Bahrick, 1983) .
Qualitative researchers should also be aware that the way in which questions are asked and the use of different words may have some or occasionally even strong influence on answers. These problems are especially serious in questionnaires. However, using an indepth interview is not a complete solution to these problems. Loftus & Palmer (1974) found in their famous eyewitness study that the mere use of two similar words-smashed or hitencouraged participants to remember that they had seen non-existent broken glass (more often in the "smashed group") in a short video of a car accident. It can be argued that studies like this lack ecological validity but these results have been supported by many other studies using a wide range of research designs (see e.g., Cassel & Bernstein, 2007; Loftus, 1996) .
Another problem appears when people might use answers created by the so-called remembering self or experiencing self (Kahneman, 2011) . Think about the question "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" The typical person has at least two choices, 1) To think of the many events that have happened recently and to try to approximate what the average satisfaction might be (answer created with the help of the remembering self); 2) Or to substitute the difficult question with an easier one and provide an answer to the question "How do I feel now?" (answer created with the help of the experiencing self). This substitution happens very often because some questions are too difficult, and even though people may tell the researchers that they are speaking in general terms there is still a chance that the answer was influenced by, for example, the weather or their mood (Kahneman, 2011; Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991) .
Fortunately, there are useful manuals (primarily aimed at survey researchers) on how to ask questions about behaviour, mood, opinions, beliefs, frequencies, etc. Qualitative researchers may find inspiration in them and see how even slight differences in wording may lead to different answers (see e.g., Bradburn, Sudman, & Wansink, 2004; Fowler, 2014; Sedlmeier & Betsch, 2002; Tourangeau, Rips & Rasinski, 2000) .
Finally, when possible, concurrent reports should be used instead of retrospective ones because they are generally of much better quality since there is less forgetting and other distortions (Schwarz, 2007) .
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A machine for creating associations and interpretations
Before reading the following text, please look at these two words:
BANANAS VOMIT
This example is mentioned by Kahneman (2011) and is a good illustration of how quickly we create associations and interpretations (see footnote on what people usually experience).
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After a second or two we have automatically made an association between bananas and vomit, and probably created a story in which bananas cause vomiting. Even without any information about how the two words are connected, a believable interpretation is created. We just cannot help but create an intuitive judgement which is usually accepted by our conscious, rational, and usually quite lazy mind later on 10 (Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010) . Another illuminating example is offered by a well-known study by Solomon Asch (1946) which asked two groups of participants about their impression of a person who is described using only six adjectives. Half of the participants got a description where the sequence 8 The anecdotal experience of many researchers also suggests that it sometimes happens that whatever research instruments and types of analysis are used, similar conclusions are reached. 9 "A lot happened to you during the last second or two. You experienced some unpleasant images and memories. Your face twisted slightly in an expression of disgust, and you may have pushed this book imperceptibly farther away. Your heart rate increased, the hair on your arms rose a little, and your sweat glands were activated. In short, you responded to the disgusting word with an attenuated version of how you would react to the actual event. All of this was completely automatic, beyond your control. There was no particular reason to do so, but your mind automatically assumed a temporal sequence and a causal connection between the words bananas and vomit, forming a sketchy scenario in which bananas caused the sickness. As a result, you are experiencing a temporary aversion to bananas (don't worry, it will pass). The state of your memory has changed in other ways: you are now unusually ready to recognize and respond to objects and concepts associated with "vomit," such as sick, stink, or nausea, and words associated with "bananas," such as yellow and fruit, and perhaps apple and berries." (Kahneman, 2011, p. 50) . 10 According to Kahneman (2011) and many others we have a dual mind. System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control (can be called "autopilot"). System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. Its capacity is very limited and gets tired quickly. It is often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration (can be called "pilot"). I use the definitions of Kahneman (2011) who borrowed the terms from Stanovich and West (2000) . started with "intelligent" and ended with "envious" (called version A) and the other half received a version starting with "envious" and ending with "intelligent" (called version B).
A: intelligent-industrious-impulsive-critical-stubborn-envious B: envious-stubborn-critical-impulsive-industrious-intelligent Even though the two sets had identical adjectives, the participants who got version A generally considered the person as good but with certain shortcomings. Those who had version B considered the person rather problematic. What is even more interesting is that ambiguous qualities such as impulsiveness or criticality were more often interpreted in a positive way in group A. Why? The most persuasive explanation is offered by the Halo Effect. The participants probably exaggerated the coherence of the story they created. Once they considered somebody as intelligent and industrious (version A) he or she was probably viewed as quite a good person even if they later on found out that this person was also envious.
Another problematic part is that when we create a story we do not like to change it, and therefore tend to suppress doubt and ambiguity (Kahneman, 2011) .
Could qualitative researchers also be too quick in creating associations and interpretations? I guess they could (including myself), because we are all human and our minds simply work like that. Even though we may later on provide sophisticated reasons for our interpretations, the first, quick, and usually automatic impression often has a great impact on our final interpretations. This is because we tend to be committed and consistent to our own conclusions once we have made them (A. J. Waarlo, Utrecht University, personal communication, November, 2013). Commitment and consistency is an infamous manipulative strategy, described by Cialdini (2009), and therefore it seems our mind auto-manipulates us not to change our ideas.
Further support for why the first quick interpretations may survive is the confirmatory bias, "a tendency to seek out information that is consistent with a belief or hypothesis and to ignore or overlook information that is potentially inconsistent" (Davies, 2003) . Once we have created a "nice looking" interpretation we easily forget to be rigorous researchers and chiefly use the positive test strategy (look only for what supports our interpretation; see e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987) and not the negative test strategy (look for what does not fit our interpretation). This is one of the reasons why using qualitative software like Atlas.ti may be better than pen and paper, because the computer never forgets that for example some material was not coded or that alternative explanations were not used (Friese, 2014) .
When people have less information or only have one-sided evidence they typically feel more confident (Brenner, Koehler, & Tversky, 1966; Baron, 2008) . This is why researchers should be cautious, especially when feeling very confident! It may simply be an illusion. Even when people are willing to swear under oath that something is true, they are surprisingly often wrong (see e.g., Neusar, 2011). 11 11 When people are willing to swear under oath, they are generally much more correct than in cases when they are not willing to swear under oath. Thus "willingness to swear under oath" is usually a very good predictor of truth. But we should still be cautious because participant certainty is by no means a 100% sure gold standard of truth.
When is an intuitive interpretation correct? The literature on expert intuition shows that intuition is correct especially when two conditions are fulfilled: the environment we study is sufficiently regular to be predictable and we have an opportunity to learn these regularities through prolonged practice (Ericsson, 2009; Vranka, 2013) . On many occasions the phenomena qualitative researchers study are not very regular and neither does the researcher have enough prolonged practice to learn from the regularities.
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To sum up, when we like an interpretation (a story) we should be more cautious, because when we like something we tend to switch off our critical mind (Kahneman, 2011; Heath & Heath, 2007) . The basic question for both researchers and readers of research studies should therefore be "do we have the critical amount and quality of information needed for the interpretation?"
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The problem with generalising from small samples Quantitative researchers are nowadays under pressure to report the power of the statistical tests they use to see whether their samples are so small that they commit a Type II error 14 (Cumming, 2012; Kline, 2013; APA, 2010) . Using small samples may also lead to a danger of committing a Type I error-for example when we conclude that we found an effect or relationship but it does not actually exist (it happened by coincidence due to choosing extreme cases).
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Some qualitative researchers, in my anecdotal experience rather a lot, choose qualitative research, not because it is more appropriate for their research, but because they hate statistics (Silverman, 2008) . This is one of the reasons we can assume that qualitative researchers will, on average, understand the variability of samples even less than quantitative researchers, who often also have limited knowledge (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971 ). Tversky and Kahneman (1971) described the tendency to believe conclusions reached from small samples as the "law of small numbers". This says that people have bias for certainty over doubt. Most people, 12 One of the reasons is also that researchers have to hunt for grants and cannot thus go deeply into one topic for a prolonged period. 13 Having enough information may be an unachievable aim in a qualitative research report, because qualitative researchers usually have limited space and have to choose what to present and what not (especially in a scientific journal). The reader therefore has to trust the researcher. On the other hand, in quantitative research, all the important figures are often presented and readers can therefore make their own interpretations. A nice solution for dealing with vague concepts or the lack of information is provided in the fuzzy approach for example (see Stoklasa, Talášek, & Musilová, 2014) . 14 A type II error accepts the null hypothesis, although the alternative hypothesis is the true state of nature. That means that there is a real difference between men and women in remembering the dates for example but because the sample is too small we do not find this difference and claim there is no difference between men and women. Most research actually finds this difference though it is not clear whether this difference is inborn or the result of different kinds of upbringing (see e.g., Neusar, 2011; Neusar, Hoferková, & Ježek, 2011; Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, Walker, & Shannon, 1994) . 15 The type I error is therefore not e.g., 5 % or 1 % as stated by our statistical test (and chosen by the researcher), but in reality may be much larger due to our problematic sampling procedure. including many experts, do not expect to reach extreme observations from small samples 16 (e.g., that all eight people in one building have the same illness) which is reinforced by the common misconception that random events, numbers, or other phenomena, do not generate patterns or form clusters. In reality they often do, but qualitative researchers may think that the patterns are a sign of a real effect (e.g., in my previous job, all the researchers apart from the departmental head had only daughters and the typical conclusion was that social scientists cannot have boys). This is also the reason why data saturation 17 may only be illusory.
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Another issue is how we deal with exceptions to rules or clusters. As mentioned above, once we have created a sound interpretation, we tend to skip the exceptions that do not fit it (Kahneman, 2011) and think of them as "real" outliers though they may be quite common cases.
The question of small samples is in general a problem of how to make generalisations in qualitative research. We can think of two types of generalisations (Mason, 2002) . The first is empirical generalisations and is often used in quantitative research. Our sample has to resemble the population as closely as possible and if it does, our results can be generalised for the whole population. This type of generalisation is therefore very rare in qualitative research. On the other hand, theoretical generalisations cannot be as easily defined and are more suitable for qualitative research. According to Mason (2002, pp. 195-6) there are several options as to what can be done and how to approach the issue: 1) A researcher can think of no reason why the sample should be different from the population. This is often a rather weak argument. We can support this argument by showing that characteristics of our sample are similar to the wider population. 2) A researcher can claim that if something happened once or several times (in the researcher's sample and in a specific context) it can happen again (Peräkylä, 2004) . In this sense the detailed and holistic explanation of one setting may frame relevant questions about others. The lessons learned from one setting are then limited to the similarities or differences between the settings. 3) Researchers can argue that they provide an extreme or pivotal case, or a set of processes that are central to a wider body of explanation or knowledge. 4) Researchers should show rigour in their analyses. There are many ways to do this, e.g., by making strategic comparisons that often contribute more to the explanation than simple statements of similarity or difference. 5) The strongest version of generalisation is probably to show how and why things work in a selected range of contexts that are strategically compared. 16 In small samples extreme cases happen more often. Finding that everyone in a very small town is healthy at a specified moment is more likely than in a bigger town. The probability, on the other hand, that all the people are ill is also higher in smaller towns (people in bigger towns will be more ill or healthy on a normal scale). This happens by pure chance, though we are prone to interpret this in terms of healthy life style etc. 17 If a sample is saturated we cannot find out anything new (e.g., categories of interest) by increasing our sample. 18 Another reason is that qualitative researchers tend to stop increasing their sample too soon (Mason, 2010 ).
If we analyse and generalise appropriately we should present enough material to enable the readers to understand our position and analytical viewpoint. We should also try to be reflexive and do our best to check alternative interpretative perspectives (Mason, 2002) . It is then up to the audience to judge how convincing our interpretations are.
What else can we do to make our interpretations more valid? Guidelines to qualitative research (e.g., Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014) recommend for example having more than one interviewer and analyst, 19 using data triangulation whenever possible, or to clearly state the possible limits of the interpretations.
This, however, does not prevent readers from over-generalising because many readers (and not only journalists) simply skip the methods sections and ignore words like "tend to" or "possibly", which weaken the authors' claims.
Conclusion
On many occasions the aim of qualitative research is not to gather as much unbiased information as possible, but to provide a thick description of an experience. In these cases the above mentioned problems regarding interpretations may not be so relevant. However, on other occasions qualitative researchers may want to make an interpretation that is as close to the reality of their respondents as possible.
In these cases researchers should be aware of the automaticity of creating the interpretations and that the automatic part may have a strong influence on them. "Good stories" are good for business literature but researchers should strive for "objective" good stories.
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On the other hand I do understand that even a biased interpretation may do some good. When societal change is important it may be more important to make a persuasive argument than an "objective" one. 21 And on many occasion, there is of course not only one possible explanation because the reality is more complex, diffuse and messy than our descriptions of it (Law, 2004) .
